CASABROVA

QUARTERLY REPORT · EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Global Investor *Briefing*

The findings in brief. Twenty-nine markets, what changed this quarter, and the four things worth acting on.

Q2 2026 · April – June, incorporating July developments

CASABROVA Score cut of 1 August 2026 · rates as of 31 July 2026

29
MARKETS ASSESSED

100K+
LISTINGS TRACKED UPDATED WEEKLY

1,493
NEIGHBOURHOODS ACROSS 178 CITIES

11
INVESTOR PROFILES PER MARKET

IN BRIEF

What this quarter was about

This is the short edition. It carries the conclusions, the board, and the numbers a buyer would act on. The full edition runs the evidence behind each one.

Q2 2026 was not a quarter in which property markets moved a great deal. It was a quarter in which our reading of them got considerably sharper. Two components of the score were rebuilt: how we assess bubble pressure, and how we measure the regulation governing the relationship between landlord and tenant — rent caps, restrictions on raising rent mid-tenancy, the grounds for recovering possession, and how long that takes.

Most of the movement on the board this quarter comes from that rebuild rather than from anything a government did. We say so throughout rather than present better measurement as market news.

Four things to take away

1 · The deeper bubble test raised more flags than it lowered. Six markets changed grade — England, Spain, Romania and Portugal upward, Thailand down, Georgia withdrawn from grading. Four of six moved toward more risk. A higher grade does not mean we found a bubble; it means the indications consistent with one strengthened.

2 · Two of the four highest-ranked markets have among the weakest landlord protection we measure. Poland ranks first with the second-lowest reading on the board; Ireland ranks fourth with the lowest. If you are buying to live in, that is fine. If you are buying an income stream, it is the most important line in this document.

3 · What you pay to borrow as a foreigner is not what the country pays. In Thailand and Mexico the gap is more than five percentage points. In Japan the widely-quoted rate is a resident product a foreign buyer generally cannot obtain.

4 · The top of the board is a group, not a sequence. Eight markets sit within 3.6 points; first and second are separated by 0.28. Treat the leading cluster as a shortlist to research, not a ranking to follow.

THE BOARD

Twenty-nine markets, ranked

CASABROVA Score, cut 1 August 2026. Change against 1 July. Landlord column 0–10, higher meaning a clearer legal route to recovering possession.

#	Market	Score	vs Jul	Rank	Bubble risk	Landlord
1	**Poland**	74.5	−1.5	▲2	Low-medium	1.5
2	Estonia	74.2	+1.3	▲5	Medium-high	6.3
3	Slovenia	73.4	+1.3	▲5	Medium	5.0
4	Ireland	72.8	−3.2	▼2	Medium	1.4
5	United States	72.0	+1.1	▲4	Medium-high	8.7
6	UAE *(Dubai)*	71.2	−4.4	▼2	Medium-high	4.0
7	England	71.2	−2.4	▼1	**Medium-high ↑**	6.3
8	Netherlands	70.9	−5.5	▼7	Medium	2.0
9	Greece	70.1	+2.3	▲5	Medium	7.9
10	Germany	69.3	+0.5	▲1	Medium	2.4
11	Denmark	69.0	−5.5	▼6	Medium-high	6.8
12	Japan	68.4	+0.2	—	Medium	3.7
13	Thailand	67.5	+3.8	▲10	**Medium ↓**	5.1
14	Romania	67.0	+0.6	▲3	**Medium ↑**	7.9
15	New Zealand	66.9	+2.0	▲5	Medium	5.0
16	Cyprus *(post-1999)*	66.7	+0.6	▲3	Medium-high	5.1
17	Israel	66.1	−0.4	▼1	Medium	7.9
18	Spain	65.8	−0.5	—	**Medium-high ↑**	6.5
19	Canada *(Ontario)*	65.6	−4.5	▼9	Medium	3.4
20	Croatia	65.5	−1.8	▼5	Medium-high	2.6
21	Georgia	65.2	+3.0	▲5	**Not rated**	3.7
22	Czechia	65.0	+1.3	—	High	5.3
23	South Korea	64.0	−4.1	▼10	Medium	3.1
24	Portugal	63.4	−1.1	▼3	**High ↑**	3.2
25	Italy	62.3	−0.1	—	Medium	4.1
26	Hungary	56.7	+1.2	▲1	High	4.4
27	Australia *(NSW)*	55.7	−7.6	▼3	High	3.6
28	Mexico *(CDMX)*	55.7	+0.5	—	High	6.5
29	Singapore	52.8	+1.2	—	Medium-high	3.7

FINDING ONE

The law is doing more work than the numbers suggest

The component we rebuilt this quarter measures two things: how an owner recovers possession from a tenant who stops paying, and whether the rent is controlled while that tenant is in place. The spread it produces is the widest of any component in the score, and it cuts across the ranking rather than following it.

Australia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, South Korea and Ireland all fell when the component was rebuilt. Korea lost ten places and Canada nine. In each case the law weights a possession dispute substantially toward the occupant, and the previous reading had not been capturing it.

> If you buy a home to live in, this component barely concerns you. If you buy an income stream, it may be the most consequential thing on the page.



> Ireland and Poland sit at the bottom of this component while ranking fourth and first overall. Their strength is elsewhere — yield, pricing, governance, bubble position. What they share is that an owner in a dispute has less legal room than almost anywhere else we cover.

FINDING TWO

What money costs you is not what it costs the country

Central banks set a policy rate. Local buyers borrow above it. A foreign buyer borrows above that again — sometimes by a little, occasionally by a great deal.



Light dot: the country's policy or reference rate. Dark dot: what a non-resident actually pays. The line between them is the premium for being foreign. Rates as of 31 July 2026.

Thailand and Mexico are the outliers. Thailand's central bank sits at 1.00% and a foreign buyer pays around 6%. Mexico's gap is wider still. In both, the local benchmark tells you nothing useful about your borrowing cost.

Japan's headline is the most misleading number in international property. A resident on a variable rate borrows at around 1.1%. The long-term fixed product priced closer to 3.3% is also a resident product — the Japan Housing Finance Agency requires Japanese nationality or permanent residence — so neither figure is available to a non-resident foreign buyer. The routes open to non-residents are few and mostly restricted by nationality: a Hong Kong-restricted product publishes 3.65%, while the channel that carries no nationality condition publishes no rate.

> **Loan-to-value moves more money than the rate does**
>
> Hungary and Romania will lend to 80%; Greece, the US and Singapore 75%. Germany and Israel cap near 50%, the tightest we see. Borrow at 50% and you fund half the purchase; at 80% you fund a fifth — **two and a half times the cash for the same property.** On a €300,000 apartment that is €150,000 down in Germany against €60,000 in Romania.

Access is often a question of residence rather than nationality: several European markets will lend to a foreigner holding a residence permit and decline the same buyer without one. Non-resident lending is genuinely constrained in Thailand, New Zealand, Georgia and Poland.

FINDING THREE

Higher yield comes with higher pressure — and sometimes with no reading at all

Higher yield, higher pressure

The markets that pay most tend to carry the most bubble-risk pressure.
Georgia pays the most of all — and is the one market we cannot grade.



> Poland is the outlier that matters: near the top of the yield range and alone in the lowest pressure band we assign. Georgia pays more than anyone and is the one market we cannot grade.

The tendency is real but the correlation is loose — Estonia and Ireland sit at the same yield in different bands, and Singapore carries elevated pressure on a low yield. Read it as a tendency, not a rule.

Georgia: a component we do not grade

Georgia previously carried our worst bubble grade. **We now publish none.** We have not stopped rating Georgia — we have stopped rating its bubble component, because the data required is unavailable for this market. The valuation measures we rely on are published on a consistent international basis by a single organisation, and Georgia is not a member of it.

This is not a clean bill of health. The absence of a grade does not immunise Georgia against a real bubble. We cannot rule one out, and that inability is a reason for more caution rather than less. Georgia has the highest yield range we track anywhere at 8.1%–13.8%, the weakest data transparency of any market we cover, and local credit at 8–12% that is largely closed to non-residents. A yield of 10% financed at 10% is not a yield.

FINDING FOUR

Your passport changes the answer

Most property comparisons quote one tax rate per country. That is the wrong shape of answer, because the rate a country charges is often not the number that decides your return.

What decides it is how your *own* country treats income you have already been taxed on abroad. We hold this at full coverage — eleven investor nationalities across all 29 markets.

The relief method matters more than the rate. An exemption means the foreign tax is final. A credit means you pay the higher of the two — so a low foreign rate simply hands the difference to your own tax authority. A buyer from a credit country cannot benefit from a low-tax jurisdiction the way an exemption-country buyer can.

Charges outside the treaty are easy to miss. France's headline 17.2% social charge is the domestic default, not the cross-border answer — anyone covered by a social-security scheme elsewhere in the EEA or Switzerland pays only the 7.5% solidarity component. Belgium adds a communal surcharge of up to 9% that survives the treaty exemption entirely.

And two widely-repeated beliefs are simply wrong. American buyers are commonly told FATCA applies to a foreign home — for property held directly in your own name, it does not. Chinese buyers are told the annual USD 50,000 quota constrains what they can buy — in fact that quota may not be used for overseas property at all.

The one-page version

Take a single Thai condominium. Thailand taxes it identically whoever buys it. A Dutch buyer's home bill lands near nil. A French buyer's treaty relief also shields the rent from social charges. A German buyer is exempt but pays a higher rate on their German income. A Belgian buyer picks up a communal surcharge. A Canadian buyer gets a capped credit with no refund on the excess, plus a reporting obligation. **Five buyers, one apartment, five materially different outcomes.**

WATCHLIST

What we are watching into Q3

Portugal. The cycle read and the bubble grade now agree and both point the same way. It entered withdrawal in 2024 and prices have continued climbing since. The market we watch most closely.

Estonia's building pipeline against its flat economy. Permits for new dwellings rose about a third in 2025. Those homes arrive in two to three years, into an economy that is not currently growing and where prices have already risen 66% in five years. If the supply lands and the demand does not, prices are the thing that adjusts.

Germany's construction rate. The slowest in more than a decade. Bearish now — builders do not start what they cannot sell. Potentially the opposite in three to five years, into cities that are not shrinking.

Israel, on timing. Foreign investment keeps arriving while construction stays slow and prices have not yet responded. Our reading is that the shift begins when there is greater certainty about the region's direction following the war involving the United States, Iran and Israel. Buyers who are otherwise ready are waiting on that clarity rather than on rates or supply.

Abu Dhabi's rent freeze. Annual increases were frozen at 0% emirate-wide in early June 2026, across residential, commercial and industrial property, until further notice. It sits with the Chairman of the Executive Council and can be lifted by administrative decision without legislation. *This does not affect our UAE score — the scored UAE row is Dubai, whose framework is unchanged.*

Short-let regulation, wherever conversion has run far. A permissive regime raises what a property can earn and therefore what it is worth — but a high concentration of short lets is itself a predictor of regulation. Barcelona is phasing them out entirely by 2028. A yield that depends on a permission is worth less than the same yield that does not.

The full edition

This summary carries the conclusions. The full Q2 2026 briefing runs the evidence behind each — the macro layer market by market, cycle position across all 29, three markets examined in depth, the complete rate and leverage tables, and the cross-border tax grid. Available at casabrova.com/editorial.

REFERENCE

Methodology and disclaimer

Scores are the CASABROVA Score, cut on the first of each month; this edition uses the cut of 1 August 2026 and compares against 1 July 2026. Bubble risk is assessed under the deepened method introduced with this cut. Where a market lacks the published data to assess bubble pressure on a consistent basis, it is shown as not rated rather than assigned a penalty.

Two components were rebuilt during the period covered — bubble pressure and landlord protection — alongside the Q2 macro refresh of 17 July. Score movements therefore combine market change with measurement change, and figures shown are total movement rather than component movement.

Where a country's tenancy law is not national, the landlord-protection reading is computed for one named jurisdiction and never averaged across sub-jurisdictions: Canada on Ontario, Australia on New South Wales, the United Kingdom on England, Mexico on Ciudad de México, the UAE on Dubai, Cyprus on homes completed after 1999, Poland on the ordinary lease. Every other input is assessed at national level. The United States is scored on our seven covered metropolitan markets — Atlanta, Dallas-Fort Worth, Las Vegas, Miami, Nashville, Orlando and Tampa — and describes Sun Belt conditions rather than the country as a whole.

We do not publish the relative weight of each component. We do publish every input, every source, and every case where we could not obtain an answer.

Cycle phases reflect 2024, the most recent year with a complete published dataset. Where 2025 figures are quoted they are identified as provisional. Mortgage and policy rates are as of 31 July 2026 and move weekly. Loan-to-value ceilings are the maximum observed, not an offer. Bubble grades and yield ranges are indicative model outputs, not verified valuations or guaranteed returns.

Disclaimer

The information presented is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal, financial, tax, or investment advice. It is not binding and should not be relied upon as the basis for any decision. Before executing any transaction or investment in overseas real estate, consult a qualified lawyer, accountant, tax adviser and any other relevant professional in the territory concerned.

Tax, regulatory and yield data change frequently. CASABROVA updates from primary sources on a regular cycle but is not responsible for the accuracy of the information or for changes not yet reflected. All figures presented are indicative only.
